Report concludes decades of failure led to deadly Grenfell Tower fire
The inquiry has found they failed to properly consider the danger of combustible materials in high-rise residential buildings
The devastating Grenfell Tower fire which killed 72 people was the result of “decades of failure” by government and the construction industry to act on the dangers of flammable materials on high-rise buildings, a long-awaited report has found.
The west London tower block was covered in combustible products because of the “systematic dishonesty” of firms who made and sold the cladding and insulation, inquiry chairman Sir Martin Moore-Bick said.
He called out “deliberate and sustained” manipulation of fire-safety testing, misrepresentation of test data and misleading of the market.
The seven-volume and near-1,700 page final report of the inquiry into the disaster laid out in damning detail how those in positions of responsibility had not heeded or acted on warnings from earlier fires.
Sir Martin said: “We conclude that the fire at Grenfell Tower was the culmination of decades of failure by central government and other bodies in positions of responsibility in the construction industry to look carefully into the danger of incorporating combustible materials into the external walls of high-rise residential buildings and to act on the information available to them.”
Grenfell United, which represents some of the bereaved and survivors of the fire, said the report “speaks to a lack of competence, understanding and a fundamental failure to perform the most basic of duties of care” as they demanded that some of the construction firms involved should be banned from government contracts.
But they added that while the final publication is a “significant chapter” in the years since the fire, “justice has not been delivered”, saying police and prosecutors must “ensure that those who are truly responsible are held to account and brought to justice”.
The Metropolitan Police said it “operates under a different legal framework and so we cannot simply use the report’s findings as evidence to bring charges” but pledged to go through the report “line by line”.
A drive within government years before the fire for deregulation meant concerns about the safety of life had been “ignored, delayed or disregarded”, the report said, despite the deadly Lakanal House fire which killed six people in 2009.
In the years after, the agenda to cut red tape was “enthusiastically supported” by some politicians in charge, the report said.
By 2016, a year before the Grenfell fire, the Government was “well aware” of the risks of using combustible cladding panels and insulation, particularly in high-rise buildings, “but failed to act on what it knew”.
Recommendations from the coroner into the Lakanal House deaths were “not treated with any sense of urgency” and “legitimate concerns” were “repeatedly met with a defensive and dismissive attitude by officials and some ministers”, the report said.
Cladding firm Arconic and insulation firms Kingspan and Celotex faced particularly heavy criticism.
Arconic was found to have “deliberately concealed from the market the true extent of the danger” of using its cladding product, particularly on high-rise buildings.
Kingspan had, from 2005 and even after the inquiry began in the wake of the fire, “knowingly created a false market in insulation” for use on buildings over 18 metres, the report said.
Celotex then, in an attempt to break into this market created by Kingspan, “embarked on a dishonest scheme to mislead its customers and the wider market”, Sir Martin concluded.
He said: “One very significant reason why Grenfell Tower came to be clad in combustible materials was systematic dishonesty on the part of those who made and sold the rainscreen cladding panels and insulation products.”
The report said these firms had “engaged in deliberate and sustained strategies to manipulate the testing processes, misrepresent test data and mislead the market”.
Grenfell United has called on the Government to ban Arconic, Kingspan, Celotex and contractor Rydon from central or local government procurement processes and “finally start acting in the British public’s interest”.
While the first inquiry report in 2019 said London Fire Brigade’s (LFB) performance “fell below the standards set by its own policies or national guidance”, the final report concluded that although the service understood the lessons from the Lakanal House fire, its failure “lay in its inability to implement any effective response”.
This failure had “many causes”, including a “chronic lack of effective leadership”, combined with “undue emphasis on process and a culture of complacency”, the report said.
Setting out 58 recommendations, Sir Martin concluded that the construction industry had become “too complex and fragmented”.
He suggested a single regulator should be put in place to be responsible for regulation of construction products, testing and certification, and oversight of building control, and for the Government to bring all functions relating to fire safety into one department under a single secretary of state.
The Building Safety Act, in particular the definition of a “higher-risk” building, should be reviewed to incorporate the likely presence of vulnerable people, he said.
Having criticised the response of government and the local council for its “muddled, slow, indecisive and piecemeal” response in the days after the fire, the report recommended the guidance on preparing for emergencies be revised.
The Government has also been urged by the chairman to establish a College of Fire and Rescue, and said the fire and rescue services inspectorate should inspect LFB “as soon as reasonably possible”.
Met deputy assistant commissioner Stuart Cundy said: “I can’t pretend to imagine the impact of such a long police investigation on the bereaved and survivors, but we have one chance to get our investigation right.
“We will be thorough and diligent in our investigation while moving as swiftly as possible.”
Published: by Radio NewsHub